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ABSTRACT
Audit logs serve as a critical component in the enterprise business
systems that are used for auditing, storing, and tracking changes
made to the data. However, audit logs are vulnerable to a series of
attacks, which enable adversaries to tamper data and correspond-
ing audit logs. In this paper, we present BlockAudit: a scalable and
tamper-proof system that leverages the design properties of au-
dit logs and security guarantees of blockchains to enable secure
and trustworthy audit logs. Towards that, we construct the design
schema of BlockAudit, and outline its operational procedures. We
implement our design on Hyperledger and evaluate its performance
in terms of latency, network size, and payload size. Our results show
that conventional audit logs can seamlessly transition into Block-
Audit to achieve higher security, integrity, and fault tolerance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Enterprise business systems and corporate organizations maintain
audit logs to enable continuous monitoring and transparent audit-
ing of system events [14, 23]. Federal laws and regulations, includ-
ing Code of Federal Regulations of FDA, Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act, etc., require organizations to maintain
audit logs for data auditing, compliance, and insurance [15].
Secure audit logs enable stakeholders to audit the state of sys-
tems, monitor users’ activity, and ensure user accountability with
respect to their role and performance. Due to such properties, audit
logs are used by data-sensitive systems for logging activities on a
terminal database systems. Often times, audit logs are also used to
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restore data to a prior state after encountering unwanted modifi-
cations. These modifications may result from attacks by malicious
parties, software malfunctioning, or simply user negligence.
Audit logs use conventional databases as their medium for record
keeping. As such, they utilize a client-server model of communica-
tion and data exchange. Due to this client-server model, audit logs
are vulnerable to a single point of trust, in which an adversary may
access the database and/or the audit logs and manipulate critical
audit information. As such, there is a need for secure, replicated,
and tamper-proof audit logs that do not suffer from this shortcom-
ing, and have effective defence capabilities to resist attacks. To
that end, we envision that blockchain technology can naturally
bridge the gap and nicely serve security requirements in audit log
management, including ensuring provenance and transparency.
Recently, research on blockchains has gained significant momen-
tum with applications spanning cryptocurrencies, health care, and
IoT [2, 9, 10], among others . Blockchains enable secure, transparent,
and immutable record keeping in distributed systems, without the
need of a trusted intermediary. Applied to the audit log applications,
blockchains can replicate audit logs over a set of peers, thereby
providing them a consistent and tamper-proof view of the system.
Furthermore, a malicious party aiming to hack the system will be
required to change all the logs kept at each peer. This in turn, in-
creases the cost and complexity of the attack, eventually increasing
the overall defence capability of the audit log application.
Motivated by this, we present BlockAudit: an end-to-end solution
that couples audit logs with blockchain systems and provides the
design capabilities of audit logs as well as the security guarantees
of blockchain systems. BlockAudit transforms the audit logs into a
blockchain-compatible data structure. It then creates timestamped
transactions from data within the audit logs and aggregates them
in a block. It uses the energy efficient Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT) protocol to create consensus among the peers over the state
of the blockchain. BlockAudit is application agnostic system that
provides plug and play services to the audit log applications.
Contributions. In summary, in this paper we make the following
contributions. (1) We highlight vulnerabilities in current audit log
applications and present a threat model to captures those vulnera-
bilities. (2) We present a system called BlockAudit, which defends
against audit log attacks by leveraging the security properties of
blockchains. (3)We provide the theoretical design of BlockAudit, and
use a real world eGovernment application, provided by Clearvillage
Inc., to implement the system model on Hyperledger. (4) Finally,
we analyze the performance of our system using three evaluation
parameters, namely the latency, network size, and payload size.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2,
we provide the background and motivation of this work. In §3, we
present the threat model, and in §4 we propose the countermeasures.
Results and evaluations are discussed in §5, followed by the related
work and concluding remarks in §6 and §7, respectively.
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Figure 1: Audit log generation in an OLTP system. We an-
notate each step with a number to show the sequence of
progression. Notice that the user generates a transaction to
change object value from C to D, and the change is then
recorded in the audit log by the database.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we provide the background necessary to understand
the operation of audit logs and blockchain.
2.1 Audit Logs and Their Vulnerabilities
Audit logs are an essential component in online transaction process-
ing (OLTP) systems such as order entry, retail sales, and financial
transaction systems [13, 22]. As such, the OLTP systems maintain
audit logs to monitor users’ activity and provide insights into se-
quential processing of transactions. Each processed payment in
OLTP system creates a unique record in the audit log. The aggre-
gate volume of transactions and the total payment made during a
financial year can be verified by consulting the data recorded in
the audit logs. Moreover, these audit logs can also be used to iden-
tify discrepancies, anomalies, and malicious activities in payments.
Audit logs have to be searchable and easily accessible from the
application, so that business users could look the chain of actions
that resulted in the current state of the business object. In Figure 1,
we provide an overview of OLTP system in which an audit log is
generated once an authorized user commits a transaction to the
database. The transaction makes a change in the value of an object
and, as a result, the database records the change into an audit log.
These changes can be later tracked and matched with the database
for auditing and provenance assurance purposes.
Vulnerabilities in Audit Logs. Although audit logs are useful
in tracking changes made to the database, and ensuring correct-
ness in the system, they are vulnerable to a series of attacks that
may compromise the integrity of OLTP systems. An attacker can
use multiple attack vectors to exploit known weaknesses in OLTP
systems and corrupt the state of the database and the audit logs.
Conventional schemes of protecting audit data include using an
append-only device such as continuous feed printer or Write Once
Read Multiple (WORM) optical devices. These systems work under
a weak security assumption that the logging site cannot be compro-
mised, which eventually keeps the integrity of the system intact.
However, this weak notion of system security at the logging site is
insufficient, and the attackers often have exploited vulnerabilities
at logging site to tamper data in the audit logs [11, 12].
If an attacker gets hold of the credentials belonging to an au-
thorized user, he can corrupt the database as well as the audit log.
On the other hand, if the attacker compromises the database by
breaching its defense, he can manipulate the database and prevent
it from populating audit logs. Then, not only he will be able to
corrupt the database, but also disable the auditing procedure by
blocking the backward compatibility of audit logs with database.
2.2 Motivation
Motivated by the use cases of audit logs and their security chal-
lenges, our aim is to come up with an end-to-end system that raises
the security standards of existing OLTP systems while maintaining
their operational consistency. We want to create a model that repli-
cates the state of audit logs across multiple entities related to the
OLTP application and maintain an append-only ledger. Moreover,
the design should be robust against internal and external attacks on
the database. If an attacker masquerades a legitimate party to gain
the status of an authorized user, the user must be notified about the
stolen credentials. If the attacker manages to infiltrate the database
by exploiting an inherent vulnerability, then the distribution of
audit logs across multiple peers must enable the detection of such
an attack, and switch the system back to a stable state.
3 THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we assume an adversary capable of both physically
accessing the trusted computing base (TCB) in the system and re-
motely penetrating the OLTP system by exploiting software bugs.
We assume an OLTP system similar to a retail sale repository im-
plementing the design logic of an application using secure com-
munication protocols such as SSL/TLS. Moreover, the system has a
database that keeps records of sales and maintains a remote audit
log that keeps track of new changes made using transactions. In
such a design, the attacker can exploit the system by launching two
possible attacks: physical access and remote vulnerability attacks.
The Physical Access Attack. In the physical access attack, the
adversary will acquire credentials of a user that has the privilege of
generating new transactions, and will use them to impersonate the
legitimate user to corrupt the database. The attacker canmanipulate
data within the database as well as the audit log. Furthermore, the
attacker will also be able to tamper the history maintained by the
audit log in order to corrupt the auditing process. Therefore, in
the physical access attack, we assume a strong adversary inside or
outside the system who has access to the key system components.
The Remote Vulnerability Attack. In the remote vulnerability
attack, the attacker may only exploit the default vulnerabilities
in the OLTP applications such as software malfunctions, malware
attacks, buffer overflow attacks etc.. In this attack, the adversary,
although not as strong as the physical access attack, may still be
able to contaminate the database and the audit log with wrong
information. Despite these adversarial capabilities, we assume that
the OLTP application is secure against conventional database and
network attacks such as SQL injection and weak authentication.
4 COUNTERING AUDIT LOG ATTACKS
To counter the aforementioned attacks, we propose a blockchain-
based design called Block Audit, which integrates OLTP systems
with blockchains guarantees to maximize the security of the system.
Blockchain systems can be used to create consensus among peers
in distributed systems [3, 17]. In the following, we provide the
design of BlockAudit, and show its applicability in OLTP systems.
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4.1 Block Audit
4.1.1 Audit Log Application. The first step in designing BlockAu-
dit is the access to a large-scale audit log generation system that
is currently being used by a an enterprise. For this purpose, we
used the services provided by ClearVillage Inc. [5], which provides
software for cities and counties, and maintains a searchable and
persistent audit log to track changes in the database. Database is
used for storing transactions, and searachable audit log is moved
to Blockchain, this allows applications to continue have simple
database queries, have sub-second response times, and benefit from
the features of blockchain by using it to store the audit log. This
can be done with minor modifications to existing applications.
4.1.2 Application Architecture. Applications provided by ClearVil-
lage use a multi-tier system architecture that comprises of web
and mobile clients, a business logic layer, an object relational map-
ping (ORM), and a database. In the following, we describe the core
functionality of each component along with the sequence of data
exchange that eventually generates an audit log.
Web Applications. Our web applications are built using asp.net,
and the user accesses the application services through aweb browser
e.g. Chrome. Additionally, native client support is provided for An-
droid and iOS, built using their respective development frameworks.
The web application and the web services are hosted on Microsoft’s
Internet Information Services (IIS) web server.
Business Logic Layer. Business logic layer is an interface between
the clients and the databases layer, responsible for implementing
business rules. Among other functionalities, the business logic layer
also manages data creation, data storage and changes to the data
with the help of ORM. Upon receiving a request from the client,
the webserver instantiates the relevant objects in the business logic
layer, which uses the ORM to send the processed object to the client.
The ORM writes changes to the objects in the relational database
management system (RDBMS) tables.
ORM. The ORM in the application provides a mapping mechanism
that allows querying of data from RDBMS using an object oriented
paradigm. Modern web applications are well suited for this tech-
nique since they are multi-threaded and are rapidly evolving. ORM
also reduces the code complexity and allows developers to focus
on business logic instead of database interactions. This application
uses NHibernate[6]: an ORM solution for Microsoft .NET platform.
NHibernate is a framework used for mapping an object-oriented
domain model to RDBMS, and it maps the .NET classes to database
tables. It also maps Common Language Runtime (CLR) data types
to SQL data types. The ORM inside the database layer creates an
SQL statement to hydrated the object and passes it to the data-
base. ORM also flushes the changes to the RDBMS, and commits a
transaction. Interactions between the application and RDBMS are
carried out using the ORM. In Figure 2, we provide the information
flow between various components of the application.
4.2 Generating Audit Logs
In this section, we show how the application generates an audit log
once the user commits a transaction. To Implement auditing for this
application, three events are used, namely IPostInsertEventListener,
IPostUpdateEventListener, and IPostDeleteEventListener.
IPostInsertEventListener event is triggered once a transient entity
is persisted for the first time. Each class that requires auditing is
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Figure 2: The information flow between various compo-
nents of the application. Notice that the transaction is gen-
erated at the business logic layer, and once the database com-
mits to the transaction it is rendered on the webpage.
Algorithm 1: Creating of audit log entry for persisting new
objects to database
1 Function OnPostInsert(PostInsertEvent e)
2 if (e.Entity == AuditLog) then
3 return;
4 if (e.Entity == AuditLogDetail) then
5 return;
6 if e.HasAttribute(AuditableAttribute) then
7 var new AuditLog(SessionId,
AuditEventType.INSERT, EntityName, EntityId,
UserId, Url);
8 for i = 0; i < e .Persister .PropertyNames .Lenдth − 1 do
9 if (suppressedProp.Contains(propertyName)) then
10 continue;
11 auditLog.AddDetail(propertyName, oldValue,
newValue);
12 if (auditLog.Details.Any() then
13 SaveToBlockchain( auditLog);
marked with AuditableAttribute, which is then used to create audit
logs for classes containing this attribute. All mapped properties are
then audited by default and a suppress audit attribute is added to
suppress auditing of a target property. Usually, and by default, all
properties are audited. However, in special cases where auditing is
not required the suppress audit attribute is added to the property.
In algorithm 1, we show the process of generating the audit log
when IPostInsertEventListener event is triggered.
When an audit entry is created, it contains a Session ID (transa-
tion ID), a class name, an event type (Insert, Update or Delete), audit
ID, creation date, user ID, URL, and a collection of values for all
properties. The collection of values consists of the old value before
the update, and the new value resulting from the update. Moreover,
during an update, the old and the new values are compared. Only
if the two values are different from one another, that the change
is committed to the audit log. In algorithm 2, we outline this pro-
cedure of updating the audit logs. Currently, these audit logs are
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Algorithm 2:Creating of audit log entry for persisting existing
objects to database
1 Function OnPostUpdate(PostUpdateEvent e)
2 if (e.Entity == AuditLog) then
3 return;
4 if (e.Entity == AuditLogDetail) then
5 return;
6 if e.HasAttribute(AuditableAttribute) then
7 var new AuditLog(SessionId,
AuditEventType.UPDATE, EntityName,
EntityId, UserId, Url);
8 for i = 0; i < e .Persister .PropertyNames .Lenдth − 1 do
9 if (suppressedProp.Contains(propertyName)) then
10 continue;
11 if (oldldValue <>newValue)) then
12 auditLog.AddDetail(propertyName, oldValue,
newValue);
13 if (auditLog.Details.Any() then
14 SaveToBlockchain( auditLog);
saved inside an RDMBS using two tables, the AuditLog table and
the AuditLogDetail table. Furthermore, the GUIDs in the audit log
are used as primary keys.
Once the audit log is generated, the application provides a link
to audit log page from the primary object. The link allows the
end users to look at the history of the object, and track down any
discrepancy caused by a system bug or malicious user activity.
4.3 Blockchain Integration to Audit Logs
In this section, we will show how the audit logs, obtained from
our application, are integrated into blockchain. So far in our design
of BlockAudit, we have an application that stores audit logs upon
receiving a transaction from a user. Now, we have to convert the
audit log data into a blockchain-compatible format (blockchain
transactions), and construct a distributed peer-to-peer network to
replicate the state of the blockchain over multiple nodes.
4.3.1 Creating Blockchain Network. The first step in our system
deployment is setting up a distributed network ofmultiple hosts that
process the blockchain transactions and create new blocks. In our
BlockAudit design, the network consists of all peers that have the
privilege of accessing the application and creating an audit log. Each
node is required to keep a copy of the blockchain at their machines
and maintain a persistent connection with the application server.
Persistent connections are necessary to maintain an up-to-date
view of the blockchain in order to process, validate, and forward
transactions, as well as to avoid unwanted forks and partitioning
attacks that may result from an outdated view of the blockchain.
In Figure 3, we illustrate the distributed architecture of nodes that
reflect the peer-to-peer model of a blockchain application.
4.3.2 Creating Blockchain Transactions. Once the network archi-
tecture is laid out, the next step is to create a blockchain-compatible
transactions from the audit log data. For that, we convert the audit
log data to a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. We prefered
JSON over other standard data storage formats such as XML, due
to its data structure compactness and storage flexibility. To obtain a
blockchain transaction, we first pass the audit log data to a function
Node 
Blockchain 
Application 
Server 
Node 
Blockchain 
Application 
Server Node 
Blockchain 
Application 
Server 
Node 
Blockchain 
Application 
Server Node 
Blockchain 
Application 
Server 
Figure 3: The network overview of nodes employing Block-
Audit. Notice that eachnodemaintains an interface that con-
nects them to the auditlog application. They exchange trans-
actions with one another during the application life-cycle.
Listing 1: Blockchain transaction generated after serializ-
ing data from the audit log. This transaction is exchanged
among the peers during the application runtime
{
"ClassName ":" SAGE.BL.InspSystem.PermitInspection",
"CreatedDate ":"\/ Date(1532366360155 -0400)\/",
"EntityId ":161031 ,
"EventType ":1,
"Id":" 9ceb8c2c -154a -49d5 -9441 -a92600db997b",
"SessionId ":" c66207c8 -63be -4703 -b858 -cbfae98a988e",
"Url ":"\/ SAGE\/ Building \/ Inspection \/
InspectionReport.aspx?srcTp=309&srcId=17552018&
InspectionTypeId=61663",
"UserId ":666 ,
"Details ":[
{
"Id":" fa268eaf -7993 -48e3 -ae6a -a92600db997b",
"NewValue ":"10",
"OldValue ":"9",
"PropertyName ":" DBVersion"
},
{
"Id":" ee2cdbc2 -9c3a -4bc9 -afba -a92600db997b",
"NewValue ":" only be available after 1:00 pm",
"OldValue ":" only be available after 2:00 pm",
"PropertyName ":" RequestComments"
},
{
"Id":" 04b15535 -7f8a -4899 -8004 -a92600db997b",
"NewValue ":"7\/23\/2018 1:19:20 PM",
"OldValue ":"7\/23\/2018 1:18:07 PM",
"PropertyName ":" LastUpdateDate"
}
]
}
that serializes it to JSON, and calls createAudit REST webservice to
create the audit log transaction. Each JSON packet is then treated
as a blockchain transaction, and as soon as a node in the network
receives a transaction, it broadcasts it to the rest of the network.
Nodes can connect to multiple peers to avoid the risk of delayed
transactions due to malicious peer behavior or network latency. In
Listing 1, we show the data structure of the blockchain transaction
that is obtained after serializing data from the audit log.
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4.3.3 Consensus Protocol. The next step in the design of BlockAudit
is to employ a consensus scheme among the peers to formulate
their agreement over the sequence of transactions and the state
of the blockchain. There are various consensus algorithms used
in blockchains, such as proof-of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake (PoS),
proof-of-knowledge (PoK), byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), etc. [16].
Each consensus scheme has its advantages and disadvantages. For
example, PoW algorithms are highly scalable to a larger set of
nodes, but have a high latency. In contrast, BFT protocols have
a low latency, but suffer from scalability issues. For more details
about consensus algorithms, we refer the reader to [7].
For BlockAudit, we use Hyperledger, which employs variants
of a BFT protocol to achieve consensus. Hyperledger is an enter-
prise permissioned distributed ledger that is developed by the Linux
foundation and maintained by a strong steering committee. It has
a growing development community that contributes towards the
wide-scale adaptation of technology as a replacement of existing
solutions. Our choice of Hyperledger is due to the design specifica-
tions of audit log applications, which require swift consensus while
typically retaining a smaller sized network.
Best suited to our current application, we decided to use Hyper-
ledger Fabric [1], which has a configurable andmodular architecture
that can be optimized for a diverse set of use cases. It also supports
deployment of smart contracts atop blockchains in general-purpose
programming languages; e.g. Java, Go, and Node.js. Since Hyper-
ledger Fabric is a permissioned blockchain, all network participants
are known to one another, and there is a weak notion of anonymity
in the system. The participants may not completely trust each other,
as they might be competitors. However, by leveraging the capa-
bilities of blockchains, trust can be augmented without the need
of a third party. Additionally, Hyperledger fabric offers pluggable
consensus, identity management, key management, and crypto-
graphic libraries that can be customized based on the scope of the
application. In Figure 4, we show the complete design of BlockAudit,
once the Hyperledger fabric is integrated with the serialized JSON
output of the business application.
5 EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
We show the experiments carried out to evaluate the operation and
performance of BlockAudit. We first extended the nHibernate ORM
to generate a serialized JSON output in the form of a transactions as
shown in Listing 1. The transactions are broadcast to the network
where a Hyperledger instance is configured at each node. For ex-
periments, we used HyperLedger Composer to set up the network
and a Node.js wrapper to receive application’s JSON transactions.
We evaluate the performance of our system by measuring the
latency over the consensus achieved by the peers. We increase the
payload size from 2MB to 20MB, and monitor the time taken for
all the peers to approve the transactions. Let tд be the transaction
generation time, and tc be the time at which it gets approval from
all active peers and gets confirmed in the blockchain. In that case,
the latency lt is calculated as the difference between tc and tд
(lt = tc −tc , where tc > tд ). We report our results in Figure 5, which
shows that irrespective of the payload size, the latency margins
remain negligible as long as the number of peers is less than 30.
As the size of the network grows beyond 30 nodes, the latency
factor increases considerably. Furthermore, we also notice, a sharp
increase in latency when the payload size changes from 5–10MB
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Figure 4: Complete system architecture of BlockAudit after
Hyperledger fabric is integrated to the JSON output.
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Figure 5: Performance of BlockAudit, as the payload size
increases. Notice that as long as the network size remains
within 30 peers, there is no significant change in the latency.
and a negligible change in latency when the payload size changes
from 15–20MB. These evaluation parameters can be used to define
the block size and the network size, specific to the needs of the
application. As part of our future work, we will use the parameters
and the rate of incoming transactions to deduce optimum block
size and the average block time for the audit log application.
5.1 Discussion
An essential component of our work is the defense against the
attacks outlined in our threat model §3. In this section, we briefly
discuss how BlockAudit is able to defend against the physical access
attack and the remote vulnerability attack. In the physical access
attack, if the attacker acquires credentials of a user, he can make
changes to the application data using the application interface. In
this case, his activity will be logged in BlockAudit. Since the log is
kept in the blockchain by the user, the attacker will not be able to
remove traces of his activity. Therefore, when the attacker’s activity
is exposed, auditors will be able to find out the effected records,
and take corrective measures to restore data to the correct state.
Moreover, if an attacker gets write access to the database, he might
change data in different tables. Since the audit log is at the ORM,
these changes will not be in the audit log, and will be detected.
In the case of a remote vulnerability attack in which the attacker
exploits a bug or vulnerability in application, the audit log would
show the effect of the changes or errors resulting from the attack.
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Additionally, the blockchain preserves the tamper-proof state of the
audit log prior to the launch of the attack. As such, the auditors will
be able to compare the audit log and the current data to spot the
changes made during the attack. In the absence of the blockchain, if
the attacker corrupts the prior state of the audit log, then there is no
way the auditors can recover from it. However, with BlockAudit, not
only the attacks are detected, but the system state is also recovered.
Furthermore, for a successful attack in the presence of BlockAudit,
the attacker will need to corrupt the blockchain maintained by each
node. Based on the design constructs and security guarantees of
blockchains, this attack is infeasible.
6 RELATEDWORK
In the following, we review the notable work done in the direction
of secure audit logging mechanisms. We contrast their work with
our approach to highlight our key contributions.
Audit Logs. Schneier and Kelsey [18, 19] proposed a secure audit
logging scheme capable of tamper detection even after compromise.
However, their system requires the audit log entries to be gener-
ated prior to the attack. Moreover, their system does not provide
an effective way to stop the attacker from deleting or appending
audit records, which, in our case is easily spotted by BlockAudit.
Snodgrass et al. [20] proposed a trusted notary based tampering de-
tection mechanism for RDBMS audit logs. In their scheme, a check
field is stored within each tuple, and when a tuple is modified,
RDBMS obtains a timestamp and computes a hash of the new data
along with the timestamp. The hash values are then sent as a digital
document to the notarization service which replies with a unique
notary ID. The unique ID is stored in the tuple, and if attacker
changes the data or timestamp, the ID received from the notary
becomes inconsistent, which can be used for attack detection.
Blockchain and Audit Logs. Sutton and Samvi [21] proposed a
blockchain-based approach that stores the integrity proof digest
to the Bitcoin blockchain. Castaldo et al. [4] proposed a logging
system to facilitate the exchange of electronic health data across
multiple countries in Europe. Cucrull et al. [8] proposed a system
that uses blockchains to enhances the security of the immutable logs.
Log integrity proofs are published in the blockchain, and provide
non-repudiation security properties resilient to log truncation and
log regeneration. In contrast, BlockAudit generates audit logs by
extending the existing ORM (nHibernate), which is localized to
ORM and other layers of business applicaiton are not effected. This
makes it straightforward for existing application to user BlockAudit.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based audit log system called
BlockAudit, which leverages the security features of blockchain
technology to create distributed, append-only, and tamper-proof
audit logs. We highlight the security vulnerabilities in existing audit
log applications, and propose a new design that extends ORM to
create blockhain-compatible audit logs. For our experiment, we used
an application provided by ClearVillage to generate transactions
from audit logs, and record them in Hyperledger blockchain. By
design, BlockAudit is agile, plug and play, and secure against internal
and external attacks. In the future, we will extend the capabilities
of BlockAudit by deploying it in a production environment, and
explore various performance bottlenecks and optimization.
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